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BOOK REVIEWS
LEADING, BUT WHITHER?
Small Boats and Daring Men: Maritime Raiding, Irregular Warfare, and the Early American Navy,  
by Benjamin Armstrong. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 2019. 280 pages. $34.95.
Naval warfare long has been classified 
into two broad schools. One approach, 
resting largely on the works of Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, has been classified as 
the “blue water,” or guerre d’escadre, 
school, and focuses on open-ocean 
battle-fleet operations. The competing 
theory emphasizes guerre de course, or 
attacks on enemy commerce, and the use 
of what today would be termed asym-
metric warfare at sea. Both terms were 
a product of the Jeune École, a group 
of French writers in the late nineteenth 
century who applied land-warfare 
theories to operations at sea. These 
theorists concluded that technological 
advances had made fleet engagements 
less relevant. Commander Benjamin 
Armstrong, a permanent military 
professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, has 
offered a new approach to examining 
naval warfare by exploring an older and 
often-neglected aspect of maritime con-
flict, guerre de razzia, or war by raiding.
Armstrong draws the idea of guerre 
de razzia from a 2003 essay by noted 
naval historian James Bradford. The 
term guerre de razzia is French and 
derives from the “colonial school” of 
land warfare advocated by Marshals 
Bugeaud, Gallieni, and Lyautey. Bradford 
laid the groundwork for navalizing 
this concept by examining the impact 
of operations conducted by John Paul 
Jones during the American War of 
Independence. Armstrong has expanded 
both the breadth of historical examples 
supporting the idea and the scope of 
what might constitute guerre de razzia.
Small Boats and Daring Men proceeds 
from the original premise of the 
Bradford essay, that naval warfare 
encompasses more than the dichotomy 
of the fleet action versus guerre de 
course orthodoxy. Whereas Bradford 
confined his definition to the temporary 
landing of forces on enemy shores, 
Armstrong adds an array of activities, 
each explored through a separate case 
study. A different conflict or unique 
theater of specific conflicts serves as 
the vehicle to explore each aspect of 
this new school of naval strategy. The 
common thread running through these 
cases is the emphasis on what would 
be termed today irregular warfare.
Armstrong addresses a range of naval 
missions that were common during 
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the age of sail. Descents on enemy 
coasts were common practice in the 
era. “Cutting out” expeditions designed 
to capture, or in some cases recapture, 
vessels in enemy hands also were typical. 
Armstrong adds some unique wrinkles 
to these regular features of warfare in 
the age of sail. In particular, one chapter 
deals not with the projection of power 
from naval vessels against objectives 
ashore or close inshore, but rather the 
reverse. He focuses on methods using 
innovative technology against a superior 
blockading force to allow a weaker 
maritime power to deter invaders. 
This chapter strikes a somewhat 
dissonant note, but the broader themes 
resonate in it as well. It also focuses 
attention on a significant subtheme—
specifically, the role of equipment 
and technological innovation.
Armstrong weaves two additional 
themes throughout his work: the focus 
on unique skill sets in addition to 
specialized equipment, and the impor-
tance of upper-level leadership. Many 
senior leaders saw these operations, 
to use modern terminology, as lesser 
included operations that were inherent 
in the normal conduct of naval warfare; 
such opinions were not well-founded. 
Further, Armstrong emphasizes 
intersectional leadership, both at the 
senior level, where empowering junior 
officers was essential, and at the junior-
officer level, where the mission-critical 
decisions were made. These operations 
served as a nursery for future suc-
cessful leaders of the U.S. Navy.
If there is a weakness in this volume, it is 
the absence of maps. The book provides 
only a single, global chart with general 
locations corresponding to the various 
chapters. As most of the narrative is tac-
tical, more and detailed maps depicting 
the individual operations would have 
been useful for readers unfamiliar 
with the geography of these events.
Perhaps the strongest part of the book 
is the conclusion, which serves to 
acknowledge that this work is a brief 
survey of an understudied aspect of 
America’s naval heritage. While Geoffrey 
Till described naval irregular warfare as 
“postmodern,” Armstrong raises the idea 
that ideas perceived as new and innova-
tive often are reinventions of ideas from 
the past. As Harry Truman was reported 
to have said, “The only thing new in this 
world is the history you don’t know.” 
Professor Armstrong offers a unique 
view of the early American navy. For 
the casual reader, it is an engaging series 
of stories. While histories generally are 
filled with the great battles, the actions 
covered in this book represent smaller, 
more frequent applications of naval 
power. For specialists, this is a frame-
work and an important call to study 
events that do not fit neatly into the 
acknowledged schools of naval strategy.
K. J. DELAMER
Our Man: Richard Holbrooke and the End of the 
American Century, by George Packer. New York: 
Knopf, 2019. 608 pages. $30.
The field of diplomatic history lends 
itself to biographies of diplomats such as 
Secretaries of State or other high-level 
officials as a means of understanding 
policies and the policy makers. Going 
through the shelves of our university 
library, one can chart the history of 
American twentieth-century foreign 
policy through the biographies on the 
shelves. These books, along with works 
such as The Best and the Brightest, tell 
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